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The Role of Background Beliefs

The background belief challenge to PTA is that, whereas CP in
volves an epistemically important position for background beliefs,
PP does not, and therefore PTA is false. I have two goals for this
chapter. The first is to explore the role of background beliefs in PP
and CP and, by doing so, to defend the background belief chal
lenge. Second, I consider two possible rejoinders Alston might
make to the challenge and argue that neither is successful.
I.

Alston on Background Beliefs in Perceptual
Practice

Is the working assumption of the last section in Chapter 2 cor
rect; do PP and CP differ on whether background beliefs enter into
the generation and justification of beliefs? It would be neat and tidy
if one could simply say that CP does involve background beliefs
whereas PP does not. But philosophy is rarely neat and tidy.
In Perceiving God, Alston's central thesis is that "putative direct
awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of be
liefs about God. " 1 One might thus surmise that Alston defends a
parity thesis in this work. He does not, however, but not for the
1. Alston, Perceiving God,

p. 9.
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kinds of reasons I have been suggesting. Alston argues there that
background beliefs sometimes enter into sense perceptual belief
formation, and that they do in several different ways. The same is
true, he says, for CP (or, as he names it there, mystical percep
tion). He suggests that one belief can be partly mediately based and
partly immediately based. He raises the question whether any be
lief is ever strictly immediately based, that is, justified on the basis
of experience alone. His reply is affirmative, but he does recognize
that sometimes, at least, background beliefs also have a function.
He considers three different kinds of beliefs that might play a role
and suggests several ways their functions differ from one another.
Overall, however, he wants to suggest that, although background
beliefs may play a role, it happens far less frequently than is some
times thought and, most important for the thesis that one can per
ceive God, background beliefs need not have a place at all. If Al
ston is right, then as far as PTA is concerned the background belief
challenge fails. But I believe the challenge does not fail, so I also
believe that Alston is not right about the significance of back
ground beliefs in CP and PP.
I noted above that Alston does not defend a parity thesis in Per
ceiving God. He does not do so, for he now thinks that PP and CP
differ because CP runs into problems with religious plurality (as
well as a lesser problem with checking procedures). I return to
Alston's discussion of these in Chapter 8. Our immediate concern
is background beliefs. Nevertheless, if it turns out that Alston is
wrong about the function of background beliefs in CP, that is, if it
turns out that there is a special role for background beliefs in CP
which is absent in PP, then he has one more reason to reject a
parity thesis between PP and CP.
Is there, then, a special role for background beliefs in CP? To
answer this question, we need to consider Alston's position on
background beliefs in PP. He quickly deals first with what he calls
"perceptual cues. " Psychology teaches us that several factors are
involved in the way things appear to us. It is not implausible to
suppose that our psyches take certain cues into account in the for
mation of perceptual beliefs. But it is equally obvious that most of
us are completely, or almost completely, unaware of taking such
factors into account. Still, it is sometimes suggested that, for
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example, "perceptual beliefs Gudgments) of distance are based on
cognitions of factors of the sort just mentioned. "2
How do beliefs about these cues function in the formation and
justification of perceptual beliefs? There are three positions taken
on this. One is that an inference (albeit unconscious) takes place. A
second suggests that the workings are completely causal and not
doxastic. The third falls in between, with the suggestion that there
is a kind of "subdoxastic" taking account of the cues. Alston sim
ply notes, and rightly so I think, that if there are beliefs involved in
such cases they are involved in "a maximally hidden way. " It is,
therefore, difficult to find sufficient reasons to suppose that such
background information is epistemically important.
Alston's second suggestion deals with what he calls "adequacy
assumptions. " His concern is the attribution of nonsimple sensory
predicates to external objects. We make such attributions on the
basis of sense experience, and when we do we are assuming that a
certain pattern of sensory qualities (difficult to describe in detail) is
a reliable indicator of the predicate's applicability. Alston calls such
assumptions "adequacy assumptions (or beliefs). " He writes:
When I take it that X is a house, or your house, or a chair, or the
chair we just bought, or a copy of Process and Reality, or a wave, or
Coit Tower, or my wife, or a primrose, I am, in effect, supposing
that the particular pattern of sensory qualiaX is presenting to me at
that moment is, at least in those circumstances, a reliable indication
ofX's being a house, or your house, or a chair. That being the case,
am I not basing my belief not just on the sensory appearance of X
but also on my belief that a sensory appearance of that sort is a
reliable indication that what is appearing is a house. . . ? Isn't every
case of nonsimple sensory-predicate attribution subject to evalua
tion, at least in part, in terms of mediate justification?'

Furthermore, although our paradigm case of a belief being based
on another is the conscious inference, we must, says Alston, recog
nize other cases in which no conscious inference is involved. For
example, one's belief that Frank is out of town might be based on
one's being told that he is, even though one never infers the former
2. Ibid.,

p. 83.
J. Ibid., p. 84.
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from the latter. Given this broader understanding of the "based
on" relationship, could it be that all our attributions of nonsimple
sensory predicates rely, although not consciously so, on adequacy
assumptions? Even if there are unconscious bases for beliefs, says
Alston, the following two observations still carry a strong negative
presumption against adequacy assumptions being part of the basis.
The first is that perceivers are typically not aware of adequacy as
sumptions being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs. The second
is that in many cases they are not the sorts of things to which one
has access.
The stronger case against adequacy assumptions being part of
the basis is that there is a level confusion lurking in the neighbor
hood. To be justified in an attribution of nonsimple sensory predi
cates one need not be justified in believing the adequacy assump
tions that support the predication. The assumption need only be
true. 4 It is simply not true that "what it takes for a condition, C, to
be sufficient for P (call this 'what it takes' 'A') must itself be part of
any sufficient condition for P. The fallacy is immediately evident
once we see that if A is satisfied, then, by the very terms of the
example, C is sufficient for P by itself, and A need not be added to
it to get sufficiency. "5 Alston's point is not that adequacy beliefs
never play a role in the justification of perceptual beliefs but simply
that they ne�d not do so.
The third kind of belief that can be relevant in perceptual belief
formation Alston calls "contextual beliefs. " There are three types
of contextual beliefs: beliefs about the setting, beliefs about posi
tion, and beliefs about normality. The first of these deals with spa
tiotemporal issues. Many houses look alike, and my knowing I am
on Elm Street, rather than some other, may be a factor in my
identifying the house that is the object of my experience. Beliefs
about position are concerned with angle of view, distance from the
observer, and state of the medium. Finally, Alston explains beliefs
about normality by example. Suppose that I thought people, trees,
dogs, and tables were constantly annihilated but replaced with ex
act replicas. This would lead me to form somewhat different be4· There is much to be said about and for Alston's concern with level confu
sions. I return to this theme in the next chapter.

5· Alston, Perceiving God, p. 86.
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liefs on the basis of the sensory array that meets me each day. Do I
thus have, contrary to the supposition, an assumption about the
relative constancy and permanence of physical substances as part of
the basis for my normal perceptual beliefs? Such an assumption
Alston calls a "normality assumption. "
In the position and normality cases, says Alston, we are not
aware of background beliefs, if we have them, at least in the ma
jority of cases. And if such beliefs do play a role it is not required
that they be part of the basis but only that they be true, just as with
adequacy assumptions. But Alston admits that the case for situa
tional beliefs being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs is stron
ger. In many cases one's location does seem important. For exam
ple, in identifying the large body of water to the west as the Pacific
Ocean, one's being in California seems to be significant. But Al
ston thinks this is not the normal case. "Even if just after forming
the belief ["Those buildings are the World Trade Center"], I reflect
that if I hadn't known I was in New York City I wouldn't have
judged those buildings to be the World Trade Center, it doesn't
follow that being in New York City was part of my basis for the
belief. "6 Other options are possible, including that the reflection in
question calls attention to what would be required for the ade
quacy of the basis, rather than its being part of the basis itself. So,
although situational beliefs may sometimes have a part in the justi
fication of other beliefs, they need not do so in every case.
But the situation is different with contextual beliefs than with
adequacy beliefs:
Here the adequacy assumption is not that the sensory pattern, A, is
generally indicative of the presence of a 0. It is rather that, given an
underlying supposition that A is an adequate basis for an attribution
of 0 only in certain circumstances rather than others, the belief in
question is that the present circumstances are of the former sort.
That gives the belief a greater claim to be considered part of the
basis, for it does indicate something distinctive about this situation
rather than just amounting to a blanket approval of the phenomenal
objective connection. But, by the same token, it offers us a different
kind of alternative to holding that it must form part of the basis.
Remember the point that the justification of perceptual beliefs is al

6. Ibid. , p. 90.
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ways prima facie, subject to being overridden by sufficient indica
tions to the contrary. This gives us another way in which a belief
can be relevant to the justification of another belief. It can be nega
tively relevant by constituting an (actual or possible) overrider or by
ruling out such. 7

Thus the suspicion that such background beliefs are relevant to the
justification of other beliefs is explicable not in terms of their being
required as part of the basis itself but as actually or possibly over
riding the basis or by ruling out overriders.
Alston takes himself to have dealt with both the subject and
predicate components of perceptual beliefs: "In both cases we have
argued that the justification might be either purely immediate or
partly mediate. As for the former, we have suggested that I might
both be able to justifiably take the perceived object to be your
house and be able to justifiably believe of it that it is shingled, just
on the basis of the way it looks. In both cases background beliefs
would normally be playing some role, even if they are not part of
the basis. " Alston goes on to suggest that there may be concern
that object identification poses greater difficulty for immediate jus
tification than does property attribution. He believes, however,
that this concern is unfounded. Object identifications do not pose
greater difficulty, since one can think of object identification in
terms of identifying the subject as one that bears certain properties.
Furthermore, any property that can figure in subject identification
can also figure as a predicate. "Instead of forming the belief that
your house needs painting, I could form the belief that that is your
house, or that that building that needs painting is your house. "8
There may, however, be a difference in degree in the possibility
of purely immediate justification for subject and predicate attribu
tion. "An indefinitely large plurality of unique individuals is out
there to be recognized, whereas there are comparatively few prop
erties we have any real need to distinguish. Hence it is more feasi
ble for us to store relatively fixed ways of recognizing properties
by their appearance than to build up comparably direct ways of
recognizing individuals. "9 This, Alston claims, suggests that in rec7· Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp.

9. Ibid.,

p.

91-92.
92.
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ognizing individuals we usually store up ways of perceptually rec
ognizing distinguishing properties of them and then use what we
have stored to recognize the individuals. We typically do not do
this in cases of property recognition. He says, however, that this is
only a difference of degree. We can and do, he continues, identify
individuals directly from their sensory appearance and sometimes
do recognize properties on the basis of others.
Finally, there is a way in which beliefs attributing certain proper
ties to a perceived object can play a role in the generation and justi
fication of an identificatory belief but not be part of the basis of it.
The belief that so-and-so is round-faced and slightly bent over may
have as its basis a certain look, and that look may be sufficient not
only for the property attribution but also for the subject identifica
tion. In fact, the look by which one identifies so-and-so may be
sufficient for the subject identification only because it is also suffi
cient for the attribution of the property. But one need not have
made the attribution in order to have made the identification.
Thus, concludes Alston, although background beliefs can and
sometimes do function in the justification of PP-delivered beliefs,
they need not do so. Furthermore, it happens less frequently then
is sometimes thought. When it does happen, background beliefs
typically function not as part of the basis itself but in such a way
that their truth is either required for the adequacy of the justifica
tion or is negatively relevant, that is, as potential or actual over
riders.
2.

Christian Practice and Background Beliefs

Alston goes on to suggest that many of the roles background
beliefs play in PP are alive in CP as well. Still, says Alston, it is
important to be clear that, even though background beliefs are
sometimes relevant in the justification of perceptually generated
theistic beliefs, it remains possible that God appears to one as being
0 and, if he does, and that is the whole story, one is immediately
justified in the belief that God is 0. This point is essential for his
thesis in Perceiving God-that direct awareness of God can provide
justification for beliefs about God.
Beyond this, however, beliefs generated by CP may be partly
mediately justified. Just as with PP, adequacy beliefs may be oper-
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ating. In fact, in many accounts of mystical belief formation (that
Alston cites), the predicates applied to God in perceptually gener
ated beliefs go beyond what is explicitly given in the experience. 10
Although positional and situational considerations have limited sig
nificance in CP, since God is not spatially located, normality as
sumptions can come in. One might suspect that one's supposed
experience of God is being artificially induced, or the work of the
devil, or caused by a nervous imbalance. But, on the other hand,
there are some consequences of theistic experience that can indicate
that the belief formation is a normal one. Spiritual and moral
fruits, for example, might show the justificatory efficacy of theistic
experience. Alston also admits that theological or metaphysical
background beliefs can have parts in belief formation and justifica
tion. In none of these cases, however, as with PP and its back
ground beliefs, do these background beliefs have to be part of the
basis, even though they may play epistemically related roles of the
kinds noted.
So, to answer the question with which this chapter began-do
CP and PP differ on the role of background beliefs?-Alston gives
a definite negative reply. Both PP and CP may sometimes have
background beliefs as part of their bases, but they nee� not do so.
If Alston is correct, then, as far as the argument of the previous
chapter goes, even if there are background beliefs involved in CP,
they are not epistemically important as far as distinguishing the
deliverances of CP and PP are concerned. Since in neither case do
background beliefs need to form part of the epistemic basis of the
beliefs generated, it seems one cannot suggest that the deliverances
of CP differ from those of PP in terms of the strength of their
justification because of their background beliefs.
I find myself in disagreement with Alston on this point. Al
though I think a great deal of what he says about the function of
background beliefs is correct, I believe he overlooks some impor
tant features of belief formations dealing with epistemically unique
individuals.
To deal with the suggestion that it is not possible to recognize
directly something one experiences as God, Alston writes:

10. Ibid., pp. 12-20.
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We should not suppose that in order to succeed in perceptually rec
ognizing an object of perception as X (i.e., become perceptually jus
tified in believing, or perceptually know, that the object is X), it is
necessary that the object appears to one as Ill, where Ill is a property
uniquely possessed by X. To perceptually recognize your house, it
is not necessary that the object even display features that are in fact
only possessed by your house, much less features that only your
house could possess. It is enough that the object present to my expe
rience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I gen
erally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of (are a reliable guide
to) the object's being your house. And so it is here. For me to rec
ognize what I am aware of (X) as God, all that is necessary is that X
present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of their
possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I
typically find myself. It is, again, not required that these features
attach only to God, still less that they be such that they can attach
only to God. And it is a matter for detailed investigation what sorts
of appearances satisfy that condition, just as in the case of sensorily
perceived objects.11

Alston takes these suggestions to reply to questions such as how
could a nythin g of which I am directly aware uniquely identify the
creator of heaven and earth, an absolutely perfect being of infinite
power and goodness. Such is the kind of question behind the back
ground belief challe ng e to PTA. The challeng e's reply is that one
cannot d irectly experience X as be ing God, since there are no
properties that are both unique to God and capa ble of bein g experi
enced by us. The challenge's position explicitly denies the point
Alston makes. Which is right?
I believe the challenge is closer to the truth. We can get at the
issue here by considering a phrase in Alston's own denial, just
quoted. "It is en ou gh, says Alston, "that the object present to my
experience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I
generally find myself, a re sufficiently indicative of . . . the object's
being your house. " Or, in the case of God, "all that is necessary is
that X present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of
their possessor's being God, at least in situations ofthe sort in which I
typically find myself." What are these situations? What are the fea
tures that can be sufficiently indicative of the object in question?
"

I I. Ibid.'

pp. 96-97-
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And, furthermore, what connection is there between the situations
and the features?
Let us take PP first. Earlier I suggested that PP gives us both
epistemically unique individual beliefs and classificatory beliefs.
But the two are not unrelated. The very means by which we clas
sify or categorize things-their properties-are also the means by
which we identify them. Alston suggests that there need not be a
unique feature attached to an object by which the object can be
identified. But he does not, I believe, distinguish carefully enough
between what we can call kind features and unique features. Sure,
Suzie's house may share kind features with other houses; they
might have the same floor plan, be the same color, and have the
windows placed in the same locations. But the use of the word
"same" here is not, obviously, intended to pick out features at the
numerically same position. The houses share the features "having
such-and-such floor plan, " "being pink, " and "having windows in
the living room, kitchen, and bedrooms. " But the houses them
selves occupy different spatial locations. What distinguishes the
houses in fact are not the kind features-features many houses
might share-but the unique features which, I suggest, turn out to
be made up of a group of features best understood as a collection
of kind features located at a specific spatiotemporal point. Suzie's
house does have a unique property: the property of "being a pink,
shuttered, . . . bungalow at Fourth and Main. " Thus, not only do
kind features distinguish houses from trees, rocks, and elephants,
as well as one kind of house from another, but those very same
features, located at a spatiotemporal point, are what make this
house the unique one it is.
But Alston does not deny this. He only denies that it is necessary
that the house display such a unique feature. Let us call the collection
of kind features located at a spatiotemporal point the "collective
feature. " Now the question is, does one experience the collective
feature that distinguishes Suzie's house from all others? Alston sep
arates the situation or location information from what is experi
enced when perceiving Suzie's house. Perhaps this is right. Perhaps
it is right because one cannot typically experience, on the basis of
phenomena alone, being in New York or California. 12 But that
12. It may be possible to get this kind of belief out of experience alone. P erhaps
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suggests that this information at best functions in the form of
background beliefs; it is information brought to the experience and
not given in it. But then Alston can admit this and say the role this
information plays is that of the potential or actual overrider rather
than part of the basis for the belief.
I believe, however, that it is a mistake to separate the situational
information from the other features of the experience. It seems to
me that the location information is not part of the belief system
I have when I form the belief (on perception alone) that this is
Suzie's house. Rather, it is part of the conceptual scheme I bring to
the experience. I objectify the experience as Suzie's house-the
pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main. At least this is true
for what we might call "local situation information, " that is, spatial
information that picks out where I am vis-a-vis the local geogra
phy (this neighborhood or that street) rather than the larger geog
raphy (such as New York City or California). That I am located in
New York or California does seem to be part of my belief system,
and when the generation of one of my beliefs requires that sort of
information then clearly the belief generated is at least partly medi
ate. But that I am in one neighborhood rather than another, on one
street rather than another, is given directly in experience and thus
the identification of Suzie's house is read off the experience rather
than into it via background beliefs. In the local cases no belief
about neighborhoods in required, since that information is built
into the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience.
Thus, as far as object identification within PP is concerned, PP
can be a conceptual reading practice and Alston is correct. Al
though background beliefs do sometimes play a role in the genera
tion of physical object beliefs, they need not do so. He is incorrect,
however, in his claim that for one perceptually to recognize an
epistemically unique object the object need not display a unique
feature. It is not enough for the object to display features that, in
the perceptually given situation in which I find myself, are suffione sees a building or set of buildings, or certain geographic features that are
unique to a certain city. But this would be the exception to the rule. You have to
be in special, well-known geographic locations for this to happen-in Anaheim
outside Disneyland, by the Hollywood sign, or at the Statue of Liberty, and the
like. Being somewhere in a small C alifornia town or on a street in Brooklyn will
not do it.

so]
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ciently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take it to
be. The "perceptually given situation in which I find myself' is
always a spatiotemporally unique one, and the features I perceive
are sufficiently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take
it to be only because I am in that spatiotemporally unique situa
tion. But being in the location is not enough; that location must
also be part of what is given in experience. The feature the object
needs to display and, in fact, that only it can display, is the collec
tive feature made up of certain kind features at a certain (local)
spatiotemporal location. We objectify our experience in exactly
these terms. PP is a conceptual-reading practice.
CP, in contrast, is arguably not a conceptual-reading practice.
There is no spatiotemporally unique situation in which the believer
finds herself as she experiences God. Nor, as has been argued, is
there any feature of God that one can experience which could not
also appear attached to other beings. Alston says that all that is
necessary for one to recognize X as God is that X present to one
features that are in fact a reliable indication of X's being God, at
least in situations of the sort in which I typically find myself. But
what might such features be that could not be duplicated by other
supernatural beings? With PP, the spatiotemporal information al
lows for the possibility of a check against duplicability. With God,
no such check exists, so the mere appearance of godlike features
always leaves one with doubts, or at least with possible grounds
for doubt, as to the identity of the object of the experience. PP
takes care of those doubts with spatiotemporal information given
in the experience.
Here we return to the difference between CP and PP noted ear
lier. With PP one can generate both classificatory beliefs (beliefs
that result from sorting among kinds of things; see Chapter 2, Sec
tion 6) and epistemically unique individual beliefs. With CP no
classificatory beliefs are generated within the practice. One need
not sort out the focus of the practice from other things, since there
is only one kind of thing with which the practice is concerned and
only one member of the kind, God. One need not sort out God
from among other things or kinds of things, since the practice has
no other focus than God. And it is built into the practice itself that
any features attributable to the objects of belief generated by the
practice are features only that object can have. But this raises the
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issue of religious plurality and the host of other practices parallel to
CP, such as Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and the like. What is
to keep one of these other gods from appearing to me with the
same properties of the Christian god? There is no spatiotemporal
grid that can help, and the background belief challenge seems to
stand. There need to be unique properties that can be experienced,
and there are none as far as God is concerned.
To generate the belief that the object of my experience is God,
that is, the god of Christianity rather than one of the others, I must
bring background information to the experience. But this, unlike
local situation information, is not something that is read off the
experience; it is not part of my conceptual scheme. It is, instead,
substantive information I use to read the experience. Is it part of
the basis of my belief? This is a difficult question. Let us answer an
easier question first. Need the information be part of a conscious
inference? No, and this is where noninferential mediated practices
come in. We might have an experience to which we bring both our
conceptual scheme and our substantive beliefs and yet objectify our
experience directly into language contained in the combination of
the two. A noninferential mediated practice is just what its name
suggest, noninferential even though the justification is mediated
through beliefs and not just conceptual schemes. Are beliefs deliv
ered by CP, therefore, partly immediately based and partly medi
ately based? No, not if what is meant by the latter is that a con
scious inference is involved. Are the beliefs part of the basis? No,
not if what is meant is conscious inference; but yes, if what is
meant is that, unless I hold the beliefs, the justification does not go
through. And it will not do simply for the beliefs to be true. They
must be part of my noetic framework. The reason is that the in
formation in the beliefs is needed for the objectification to go
through, and this is not just a matter of justification but of getting
the belief itself generated.
There is more to be said about the position of background be
liefs in CP and their epistemic importance. Nevertheless, enough
has been said to begin to evaluate my tentative suggestion that CP
has a special place for background beliefs that PP fails to have and
thus that PTA is not true. If I am right in the argument of this
section, then CP and PP do differ on the function of background
beliefs. And if this role is epistemically important, as I suggested in

52]
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Chapter 2, then PTA is not true. But there are some po t ential re
sponses and rejo inders to the ac coun t as presented thus far, and we
can consider them n ow.

3.

A Potential Response and Rejoinder

Perhaps Alston could attempt to circumvent this challenge by
suggestin g that in fact one need not use background beliefs in the
formation and justification of theistic beliefs. Instead he might sug
gest an understanding of expe rie nce in which the needed interpre
tive structures and concepts are part of the e xperie nce itself. Such
an approach to my stic al experiences is uncovered and discussed by
J. William Forgie.
After discussing several "hyper-Kantian" interpreters of mystical
experience, Forgie writes:
The picture these writers present seems so far a familiar one. For
Kant, experience is a compound, a product of sensory intuitions.
filtered, as it were, through a priori concepts. . .. But as we will see,
this "rival " view is really [not just Kantian but) hyper-Kantian in at
least two respects:
(1) First, for Kant the a priori concepts, the categories, are twelve
in number and are shared by all mankind. And they are inescapable.
Human beings must experience the world in terms of cause and
effect, and substance and attribute, if they are to experience it at all.
. . . But the rival view extends an experience-shaping role to con
cepts and beliefs which vary from one culture-more pertinently,
one religious tradition-to another. Mystical or religious experi
ences are partially determined or shaped by concepts and beliefs that
are peculiar to the particular religious tradition of the one having the
experience. Let us call these elements which shape experience, but
are not categories, "category-analogues."
(2) Second, experience for Kant is, very roughly speaking, essen
tially judgemental; having experience is inseparable from making
judgements about it. The categories "shape " experience by deter
mining that those judgements will take certain forms. They do not
contribute to the phenomenological content of the experiences they
shape. . .. [However,] category-analogues shape experience by par
tially determining its phenomenological content.13
13. J. William Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical
Experience," Religious Studies 21 (1985): 20 5-18, quotation p. 208.
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According to the hyper-Kantians, mystical experiences are a result
of "category-analogues" and "experiential input" working together
so that one cannot, legitimately, separate the two. The phenome
nological content of an experience is a hybrid of category-ana
logues and other sensory (or sensory like) input. Further, unlike
Kant's understanding of experience, according to which all humans
share the same categorical structure and hence have the same expe
rience, mystical experiences are different from one another because
our category-analogue structures are different.
Forgie goes on to argue that, if the hyper-Kantian understanding
of mystical experience is plausible, it carries with it "sceptical im
plications about one sort of evidential value mystical experiences
are sometimes thought to have. "14 He has in mind here the pre
sumption of veridicality typically given to sensory experience and
often extended to mystical experience, namely, that barring special
circumstances, what one seems to experience is what one experi
ences-that one's experiences are, barring special circumstances,
accurate.
Although this presumption of veridicality seems to be true for
ordinary sensory experiences, it is not true for hyper-Kantian expe
riences, whether sensory or mystical. Forgie suggests that the pre
sumption of veridicality is not upset by the Kantian categories, but
it is by the category-analogues. "Suppose I am in the presence of a
supernatural being who acts on some appropriate 'faculty' of mine.
During this encounter certain sensory or super-sensory input gets
mixed with input from the category-analogues, with the result that
I have an experience in which it appears that I am confronting a
personal and loving being."15 Now, further suppose that the suffi
cient cause of my experience of those characteristics is the cate
gory-analogues. After ruling out certain potential confusions about
what this picture entails, Forgie goes on to argue that the hyper
Kantian explanation rules out the presumption of veridicality.
At least that is what we would say in a sense perceptual case.
Suppose one sees the arches in a cathedral as Gothic because of a
category-analogue, when the arches are actually Romanesque. Be
fore discovering the existence of the category-analogue, one would
follow our usual rule suggested by the presumption of veridicality:
14· Ibid., p. 205.
IS. Ibid., p. 2 I 6.
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what one sees is what is there to see. But once discovering the
causal role of the category-analogues, the presumption of verid
icality is no longer granted epistemic weight. In like manner, if we
have an experience of a personal and loving being and the experi
ence of the characteristics is caused by category-analogues and we
know this, then the experience loses its presumption of verid
icality-unless the category-analogues are epistemically justified.
But how could they be? Our categories need no justification, at
least not in a straightforwardly epistemic sense, since they are what
make experience possible. Furthermore, the categories seem not to
be the kind of thing that could be justified. Likewise, it seems,
with category-analogues. With the latter, however, we do not
need them for experience to be possible. So why trust them to give
us veridical beliefs-unless the content of the category-analogues
could be understood in some other way, perhaps as beliefs? But
this is what Alston needs to avoid.
If this argument is correct, the hyper-Kantian understanding of
theistic experience removes any presumption in favor of the expe
rience's veridicality. We can therefore conclude that, insofar as Al
ston might attempt to use a hyper-Kantian approach to defend his
objectification account of theistic experience, there is little if any
presumption in favor of the veridicality of the resulting experience.
Barring other special circumstances or conditions that make it rea
sonable to take the experience as veridical, theistic beliefs formed
via hyper-Kantian experience do not have the same epistemic sta
tus as the deliverances of PP.16 Thus this potential rejoinder is not
successful.
4·

A Second Response and Rejoinder

A second rejoinder to the background belief challenge can be
found in Alston's own work. Alston argues that
r6. One might suggest that this is merely another version of what Alston al

ready rules out, namely, that challenge that calls attention to the lack of universal
objectification of experience. Although nearly everyone usesPP, not everyone uses
CP . But a moment's thought shows that the hyper-Kantian challenge rests on
different grounds, grounds accepted by all in the case ofPP . If we reject instances of
the employment of PP because of hyper-Kantianism, we should surely reject in
stances of CP because of hyper-Kantianism-unless there are special reasons not to.
But it is difficult to see what those reasons might be in this case.
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even if an individual's account of the phenomenology of his/her
own experience is not infallible, it must certainly be taken seriously.
Who is in a better position to determine whether S [the person pur
porting to have theistic experiences] is having an experience as of
something's presenting itself to S as 0 than S? Thus we would need
strong reasons to override the subject's confident report of the char
acter of her experience. And where could we find such reasons? I
suspect that most people who put forward . .. alternative diagnoses
do so because they have general philosophical reasons for supposing
either that God does not exist or that no human being could per
ceive Him, and they fail to recognize the difference between a phe
nomenological account of object presentation, and the occurrence of
veridical perception. In any event, once we get straight about all
this, I can not see any reason for doubting the subjects' accounts of
the character of their experiences, whatever reasons there may be for
doubting that God Himself does in fact appear to them. 17
I have been careful to distinguish between the question of verid
icality and the question about the object of the experience. Further
more, the point of my argument is to deny Alston's claim that
there is no reason for doubting the subjects' accounts. On the phe
nomenological level, I have suggested, one does have at least some
reason to be suspicious of the subjects' characterization of their ex
periences as being of God.
My argument is based on an analysis of what can be given phe
nomenologically in the experience. There is never a direct, concep
tual-reading experience that is phenomenologically of God or any
other epistemically unique person. Belief formations involving
epistemically unique individuals always involve a role for back
ground beliefs or for spatiotemporal information given in the ex
perience. This is true whether the belief formation is inferential or
not. But the only things we can experience as having the requisite
kind of spatiotemporal location are physical objects, and those, for
the most part, only of a certain class-those without intentionality
and free will that gives them the ability to move around (i.e., any
physical thing that is neither a human nor a nonhuman animal).
Thus one cannot experience phenomenologically a uniquely instan
tiable property or any property that is guaranteed phenome
nologically to identify an epistemically unique individual where
17. Alston, "Experience of God," p. 7-
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that individual does not have what we can call "spatiotemporal
rootedness."
Alston claims that the subjects' accounts do exactly what I have
argued they cannot do legitimately:
If our cases are to conform to our account of perceptual conscious
ness, they must (phenomenologically) involve God's appearing to
their awareness as being and/or doing so-and-so. And so our sub
jects do tell us. God is experienced as good, powerful, loving, com
passionate, and as exhibiting "plentitude." He is experienced as
speaking, forgiving, comforting, and strengthening. And yet how
can these be ways in which God presents Himself to experience?
Power and goodness are complex dispositional properties or bases
thereof, dispositions to act in various ways in various situations.
And to forgive or to strengthen someone is to carry out a certain
intention. None of this can be read off the phenomenal surface of
experience. This is quite different from something's presenting itself
to one's sensory consciousness as red, round, sweet, loud, or pun
gent. Isn't it rather that the subject is interpreting, or taking, what she
is aware of as being good or powerful, as forgiving or strengthen
ing? But then what is God experienced as being or doing?'"
Alston considers this issue in his "Perception of God,"19 but he
summarizes his argument briefly in the essay just quoted:
The basic point is that we have different sorts of concepts for speci
fying how something looks, sounds, tastes, or otherwise percep
tually appears. There are phenomenal concepts that specify the phe
nomenal qualia that objects present themselves as bearing-round,
red, acrid, etc. But there are also comparative concepts that specify a
mode of appearance in terms of the sort of objective thing, event,
property or whatever, that typically (normally . . . ) appears in that
way. In reporting sensory appearances we typically use comparative
concepts whenever the appearance involves something more com
plex than one or two basic phenomenal qualities.Thus we say, "She
looks like Susie," "It tastes like a pineapple," "It sounds like Bach."
There undoubtedly is in these cases some complex pattern of simple
phenomenal qualia, but it is usually beyond our powers to analyze
the appearance into its simple components. And so we are typically
thrown back on the use of comparative concepts to report how
18. Ibid.
19. Alston, "TheP erception of God,"
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something looks, tastes. . . . And so it is in our religious cases. Our
subjects were telling us God presented Himself to their experience as
a good, powerful, compassionate, forgiving being could be ex
pected to appear. And so in reporting modes of appearance in the
way they do they are proceeding just as we do in reporting modes
of sensory appearance.'"

One might attempt to use these claims in reply to the back
ground belief challenge to PTA. One might say, for example, that
one has a complex concept of God, and that phenomenologically
describing what one perceives when engaging in CP does not in
volve appeal to background information or beliefs but only to the
concept. I believe, however, that Alston's suggestions cannot be
used in response to the points of my analysis. Suppose that we
grant Alston his distinction between phenomenal and comparative
concepts and we further grant him the point that we use phenome
nal concepts in cases of simple identifications and comparative con
cepts in cases of complex identifications-those cases in which
there is a need for specifying a "mode of appearance in terms of the
sort of objective thing." But identifying a sort of thing-a house,
car, person-is not the same as identifying an individual thing. In
identifying Suzie's house, Tom versus Tim Tibbitts, and God, we
are identifying what I have called epistemically unique individuals,
not sorts. So, although we do make claims such as "It looks like
Suzie's house" or "It looks like Tom," these kinds of appeals are
not, I suggest, comparing one's present experience to concepts of
other houses or people but to one's memory of an earlier (or imag
ined) experience of the epistemically unique individual person or
thing.
But there are two kinds of case with which we need to concern
ourselves: cases where the object involved is spatiotemporally
rooted and cases where the object is not. In both cases memory is
important, since we must be "introduced" to the object. In the case
of spatiotemporally rooted objects, the introduction can be done
simply by our experiencing, for the first time, the object qua the
object-at-this-location (or by "experiencing" the object in our
mind's eye as someone describes the object-at-such-and-such-loca
tion). We then use the local situation information, now "locked
20. Alston, "Experience of God," pp. 7-8.
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into" our conceptual scheme, to form beliefs about the episte
mically unique object when we reidentify it. Here memory func
tions only in the sense that the spatiotemporal information be
comes part of our conceptual scheme.
In the other case, there is no information we can "lock in" that
uniquely picks out, when taken together with the nonspatiotem
poral features, the object in question. Thus there is always an ap
peal, conscious or not, back to our initial introduction, whether
the introduction is a literal one-say, by the human person we are
meeting or by a mutual acquaintance-or some other kind of in
troduction, such as when we meet an animal and give it a name or
otherwise identify it. 21 But, in these cases, when we reidentify the
person or animal we must appeal to background beliefs, since there
is not sufficient information in our conceptual schemes. And the
phenomenological information given in our reidentificatory expe
riences is never enough to identify them, even when we do re
member "what they look like." The possibility of mistaken iden
tity is a live one, since any feature this person has is a feature she
may share with someone else, at least as far as experience alone
goes.
Thus, in this second class of cases, to identify an epistemically
unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, we must have
background information of a substantial sort such as "Tim is out of
town. " Unlike the concept of house or person-(comparative) sor
tal concepts-which can be applied successfully in totally new situ
ations, concepts of epistemically unique individuals cannot be. The
phenomena themselves, even when the perceiver has a fully de
veloped conceptual framework, cannot do it. To identify an epi
stemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, in short,
we must appeal to information other than mere concepts, even if
they are comparative concepts. So there are three kinds of complex
21. There is, perhaps, a kind of continuum involved with spatiotemporal root
edness. A tree is more or less permanently fixed, a house likewise. But animals are
not. Some of them, however, are caged, corraled, or otherwise fixed and thus have
a somewhat stationary location. Other animals are not and are free to go where
they please, barring physical obstacles. Humans, along with certain birds and sea
creatures, are perhaps at the high end of this scale with the least fixed location,
unless jailed, kept in zoos, or otherwise constrained. God, being nonspatial alto
gether, is the paradigm case of an object that is not spatiotemporally rooted.
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identifications, one in which comparative concepts are used to
identify a sort of thing, one in which local spatiotemporal concepts
(initially created in the perceiver in his or her first real or imagined
experience of the object) are used to identify an epistemically
unique but spatiotemporally rooted individual, and one in which
beliefs are used to identify and reidentify an epistemically unique
but spatiotemporally nonrooted individual. Alston does not distin
guish among these three.
Alston is right in calling attention to the distinction between
simple and complex cases of perceptual identification, but this does
nothing to explain how, in the cases of complex individual identi
fication, we identify the object of the perception. Everything in
my argument could be true even if Alston's basic distinction is a
good one: totaling all the experienced qualia does not give us con
clusive grounds for the individual identification, except in cases of
spatiotemporally rooted individuals.
If the arguments of this and the preceding chapter are correct,
some questions about PP and CP still need to be answered, along
with questions about Jnw· Is Alston's notion of Jnw finely tuned
enough? Is there not a difference between a practice that supplies us
with conceptual-reading beliefs and one that provides us with non
inferential mediated beliefs? And does this difference not give us
some cause for concern about whether CP, since it does appear to
rely on background beliefs, is as epistemically secure as PP? Now,
if this difference is a reason to question CP's epistemic strength as
compared to PP's, then PTA fails. But at this stage all that is safe to
conclude is that Jnw is too broad a category and therefore stands in
need of further refinement.

